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M

assacre at Mountain Meadows: An American Tragedy, the longawaited history of the 1857 catastrophe at Mountain Meadows
by Ronald W. Walker, Richard E. Turley Jr., and Glen M. Leonard, was
recently published by Oxford University Press. Ronald Walker has
a PhD in history from the University of Utah. Now an independent
historian, he was a professor of history at Brigham Young University.
Richard Turley has a JD from BYU. He is the past executive director
of the Family and Church History Department of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints and current Assistant Church Historian.
Glen Leonard has a PhD in history and American studies from the
University of Utah. He is the former director of the Museum of Church
History and Art. Each of these authors has made significant contributions to Mormon studies. Early reports are that the book is selling
briskly and that it went into its fifth printing less than two months
after publication.
The volume is 430 pages in length, but the basic narrative is a compact 231 pages consisting of a prologue, fourteen chapters, and an epilogue. About one-third of the remaining 200 pages contains a lengthy
acknowledgment and four appendixes identifying the victims and their
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property as well as, to the extent known, the participating militiamen
and Indians. The remaining nearly 130 pages consist of endnotes and a
useful index. The text includes a number of historical photographs of
important personages in the narrative, historical woodcuts portraying
the massacre, photostats of key documents, and some excellent topographical maps and aerial photographs. The endpapers contain a handsome map of the western United States showing the emigrant trail from
northwest Arkansas to Mountain Meadows in southern Utah. The dust
jacket—black with the title and authors’ names in pale pink above a
dark image of the sagebrush and foothills of Mountain Meadows—may
not be to everyone’s tastes, but I found it both handsome and appropriate to the subject matter and tone of the text.
The preface explains the context in which the authors prepared
their book and their purposes in writing it. It also reveals the authors’
framework for analysis, theme, and methodology. Quoting Juanita
Brooks, the author of The Mountain Meadows Massacre (1950), these
authors indicate that the massacre is like “a ghost which will not be
laid” to rest (quoted on p. ix). This was epitomized in an incident at
the 1990 dedication ceremonies of one of the memorials at Mountain
Meadows. Some Latter-day Saints suggested that the massacre should
be viewed by the living as not merely a tragedy but also as an opportunity for mutual understanding and “a willingness to look forward
and not back.” But Roger V. Logan Jr., an Arkansan with family connections to many of the massacre victims, contended that there had to
be some “looking back” (p. x). “Until the church shows more candor
about what its historians actually know about the event, true reconciliation will be elusive.” The authors agree: “Only complete and honest evaluation of the tragedy can bring the trust necessary for lasting
good will. Only then can there be catharsis” (p. x).
Thus thoroughness, candor, and following the evidence to whatever conclusions it might reasonably lead were among their objectives.
They also sought a “fresh approach” that considered “every primary
source [they] could find” (p. x) They also decided that their history
would not be primarily a response to previous historians. This was
almost certainly a correct decision. By taking this tack they have
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avoided the defensiveness that inevitably pervades histories that contest at great length the conclusions of other historians.
They also attempted to be as exhaustive as their resources would
allow in locating relevant source material. They or their associates
scoured the archives and repositories of many states in a quest for
new sources. Closer to hand they combed the church archives and
requested materials from the First Presidency of the church. Here
the sources preserved by former Assistant Church Historian Andrew
Jenson become important. In the 1890s, Jenson was commissioned
by the First Presidency to interview massacre witnesses. The result
was a collection of materials from militiamen and others. Some were
firsthand accounts in the form of letters or affidavits. There were also
third-person accounts, some of which were collected and summarized
by Jenson himself. Some of the “Jenson material” has been consulted
and described before. For example, in Camp Floyd and the Mormons,1
Donald Moorman and Gene Sessions make occasional reference to it,
as does Will Bagley in Blood of the Prophets.2 But much of the Jenson
material is new, particularly that identified in the endnotes as AJ2
(Andrew Jenson 2). The evaluation of new sources that other historians have not yet seen can only be fully accomplished after that material
has been made available to other researchers and, ideally, published.
But there are good reasons to believe that the new sources contain
valuable new information about the massacre and its aftermath.
The wealth of sources eventually led them to conclude that they
had too much material for one volume. Thus the current volume narrates the massacre and analyzes its antecedents, context, causes, and
conditions. A second volume to be completed by Richard Turley will
address the aftermath of the massacre, including the John D. Lee trials
of 1875–76.
The authors note the polarized historiography of the massacre,
with some past writers seeing the perpetrators as demons incarnate
1. Donald R. Moorman and Gene A. Sessions, Camp Floyd and the Mormons: The
Utah War (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992).
2. Will Bagley, Blood of the Prophets: Brigham Young and the Massacre at Mountain
Meadows (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002).
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while others, mostly within Utah, demonize the victims and attempt
to exculpate the perpetrators. The authors have little sympathy for
either approach. These approaches ignore “how complex human beings
can be” (p. xiii). On the one hand, “nothing the emigrants [made up
mostly of women and children] purportedly did comes close to justifying their murder.” On the other hand, most of the militiamen led
lives of decency except for “a single, nightmarish week in September
1857” (p. xiii).
This fact led them to a “troubling question”: “How could basically
good people commit such a terrible atrocity?” Consulting the growing scholarly literature on mass killings and violence, they found that
such violence, especially against racial, ethnic, or religious minorities,
was all too common in nineteenth-century America. Since the 1960s,
scholars have been probing the regional, national, and transnational
sources of American violence. The research has revealed what the
authors describe as a “familiar step-by-step pattern” to mass killings
and vigilante violence. It also led them to one of the “bitter ironies”
of Mormon history: “Some of the people who had long deplored the
injustice of extralegal violence became [at Mountain Meadows] its
perpetrators” (pp. xiii–xiv).
In consulting the literature on violence and mass killings, the
authors make one of their greatest contributions. Simply stated, they
have developed an analytical framework that makes the massacre
explicable. The process they identify begins with the tendency of one
group to classify another as “the Other” (that is, as wholly and radically different from “our” group). There follows a process of “devaluing and demonizing” in which the members of the Other are stripped
of their humanity and transformed into enemies. Other factors are
an authoritarian atmosphere, ambiguity, peer pressure, fear, and
deprivation (pp. xiv). Results can be particularly catastrophic in times
of moral crisis or war. Rumors spring to life and proliferate wildly.
Threats are misperceived and exaggerated. Predictably, the response is
one of gross overreaction out of all proportion to the threat. Genocide
studies ranging from the Armenian genocide of 1915 to the Holocaust
of the 1940s in Nazi Germany to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 all
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bear the stamp of this process, as do many lesser mass killings. The
same framework is helpful in understanding many tragic episodes
in American history involving the abuse, mistreatment, or murder
of Native Americans, African Americans, Hispanics, Chinese, Irish,
and, we may also note, Mormons.
As important as these concepts of “extralegal violence and . . .
group psychology” are, however, the authors are not so wedded to
“historical patterns or models” as to ignore assessing “institutional
and personal responsibility.” “We believe errors were made by U.S.
President James Buchanan, Brigham Young and other Mormon leaders, some of the Arkansas emigrants, some Paiutes, and most of all by
setters in southern Utah” (p. xiv).
The authors acknowledge that the massacre has sparked a long history of “charge and countercharge” and no small number of conspiracy theories. For that reason they treat in detail the final days leading
to the mass killing. “We hope that readers will see not scapegoats but a
complex event in which many people and forces had a role” (p. xv).
The Early Mormon Experience
After a brief prologue, chapters 1 and 2 establish the background
and context. Deftly they trace the formation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints in New York and the Mormon leaders’ fateful decision to move west to the edge of the American frontier. There
the Mormons eventually encountered resentment, opposition, and
violence in western Missouri (1833–39) and western Illinois (1844–
46). Although this is a familiar story, the authors’ treatment seems
fresh because of its focus on the initial violence against the Latter-day
Saints and some Mormons’ growing reliance on violence to defend
themselves. After the assassination of Mormon leaders Joseph and
Hyrum Smith and the acquittal of their alleged assassins, many Saints
repressed their pent-up outrage. But in the hearts of many Mormons
this and other injustices festered. Although their hegira to what became
Utah Territory granted them a ten-year reprieve from direct attacks,
conflict began brewing in early 1857, when federal officials reported
what they perceived as abuses in Utah to newly elected President James
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Buchanan. As one of his first presidential acts, Buchanan precipitously
determined to send federal troops to Utah—without conveying a
word to the acting territorial governor in Utah, Brigham Young. The
authors also treat the zeal of the Reformation of 1856–57 in Utah and
the elaboration of Mormon thought about “blood atonement.”
The Mormon practice of polygamy is also treated, although I wonder if it doesn’t deserve greater stress. Polygamy must have been a significant cause of the psychic distance between Mormon settlers and
the Arkansas emigrants who traversed Utah in 1857. To Arkansans’
eyes the Mormon women living in polygamous relationships must
have seemed not much better than prostitutes. One wonders whether
the reports that some Arkansans “abused” Mormon women were due
to their revulsion at seeing polygamy in practice.
The Utah War Crisis
Chapters 3 through 5 narrate the Mormon buildup, militarily and
otherwise, in northern and southern Utah from 24 July to September
1857 to meet the anticipated conflict with the approaching federal
army. In the week after 24 July, Brigham Young and other Mormon
leaders crafted a strategy to prevent or at least delay the Army expeditionary force from entering Utah. In the first week of August these
plans—to save grain, reorganize and train local militias, and reconnoiter the eastern mountains for army scouts or detachments—were
couriered to southern Utah where the regimental commander of the
Iron Military District, Colonel William H. Dame, set about implementing the orders. Colonel Dame relayed the orders to Majors
Isaac C. Haight and John M. Higbee in Cedar City, the heart of southern Utah’s Iron Mission. Haight was also the stake president in Cedar
City, and Higbee was his counselor. Although Dame, Haight, Higbee,
and Cedar City bishop Philip Klingensmith were Americans, the bulk
of the ironworkers in Cedar City were recent working-class European
immigrants—mostly English, Scots, and Irish with a smattering of
Scandinavians.
Apostle George A. Smith, one of the original founders of the
southern Utah settlements, returned to the area in the first week of
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August 1857, and the following week he began a tour of all the southern
settlements. News of “invasion” had arrived in southern Utah ahead
of him, and from Smith we get an important contemporary account
of the “alarm” that gripped southern Utah. Smith himself acknowledged that his preaching bore a martial tone, and an observer characterized one of his addresses as “a regular war sermon” (p. 53). No
doubt Smith’s sermons on preparedness—including an explicit warning that they should be prepared to abandon their homes to the supposed invaders and retreat to the mountains for survival—increased
the sense of alarm verging on panic in southern Utah. Yet it is also
true that some of the alarm came from other sources besides Smith.
For instance, as Smith advanced from Parowan to Cedar City, then on
to Fort Harmony and Washington, it was express riders who advised
his entourage to watch for U.S. troops in the eastern mountains. After
circling to Fort Clara (present-day Santa Clara), Mountain Meadows,
and Pinto, he returned to Cedar City. There he found that rumors
were now circulating about an army detachment approaching Cedar
City through the eastern canyons. This pattern of rumor proliferation
continued as Smith proceeded north to Beaver. The negative impact of
the invasion rumors on the fragile sense of security in southern Utah
cannot be overemphasized. Tragically for the Arkansas emigrant
train, this was the settlers’ agitated psychological state at the time the
roughly 140 men, women, and children entered southern Utah early
that September.
The Arkansas Company
Chapter 6, “The Splendid Train,” narrates the background and
progress of the Arkansas emigrant train. It is chock-full of intriguing
details that the authors’ sleuthing has uncovered. The authors paint
a colorful portrait of John Twitty Baker, generally known as Captain
Jack. Baker was a substantial rancher with a large herd of cattle. Joining
the Baker outfits were the Mitchell and Dunlap families, along with
(unidentified) drovers to drive the herd. Another of the main family
groupings was led by Alexander Fancher. Fancher had a smaller herd
than Baker, but he had already made the round-trip to California at
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least once. His prior trail experience would have been invaluable. He
was joined by immediate and extended family members. Also joining their caravan were members of the Huff, Jones, Tackitt, Poteet,
Campbell, and Cameron families. The Baker and Fancher companies experienced the usual assortment of trail misfortunes and stock
losses. In addition, traveling at close quarters raised tensions that led
to some conflict within the company. The authors also found that some
Missourians joined these Arkansas companies. To many Mormons of
that period, the term Missourian harked back to anti-Mormon persecution and violence.
Chapter 7 treats the atmosphere in Great Salt Lake City in midsummer 1857. The summer months brought a peak in the annual flow
of emigrant trains through the territory. Meanwhile, as Nauvoo Legion
commanders continued their war preparations, Brigham Young
attempted to forge alliances with as many local Native American
tribes as possible. When some tribes ignored these overtures, he dispatched Dimick Huntington, his chief Indian interpreter, to offer further inducements. Eventually Young, through Huntington, offered
cattle bound for California on the northern and southern trails to the
Indians in exchange for closer ties. This was Young’s controversial new
Indian policy, a sign of his desperation to make Indian allies. If that
failed he hoped at least to induce Indians not to ally themselves with
the U.S. Army, whose commanders were also courting their favor.
Chapters 8 and 9 narrate the passage of the Arkansas emigrants
through central Utah. Much of this is familiar, although here too
the authors provide new details about the Fancher and Baker companies; the later emigrant trains of Nicholas Turner, William Dukes,
and Wilson Collins; and the freighters, Sidney Tanner and William
Mathews. They document conflicts in several locales over pasture for
livestock and personality conflicts between some Mormon settlers
and a “Dutchman” traveling with the Arkansas trains (p. 111). But the
authors also document a surprising number of nonconfrontational
encounters between the Arkansans and some Mormons bound for the
south. They also treat at length the encounter at Corn Creek between
the southbound emigrants and George A. Smith’s northbound party.
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A traditional tale told by some Mormon militiamen (but disputed by
others) was that at the Corn Creek encounter on 26 August, the emigrants poisoned an ox that they left for the Indians. The tale has had
an extraordinarily long life, but the authors convincingly argue that
the evidence for poisoning is suspect. The more likely explanation is
that the cattle contracted anthrax, a disease that occasionally flared
up on the overland trail. Yet the poisoning tale developed legs and
soon spread far and wide. For the better part of 150 years it was a common explanation for supposed Native American antipathy toward this
party. That story added weight to the account hatched by some militia
perpetrators that Indians had attacked and slaughtered the emigrant
company to avenge the death of Indians poisoned at Corn Creek.
Yet in the charged atmosphere of 1857, some Mormon settlers
accepted as fact the rumor that the emigrants poisoned the Indians.
In terms of our modern understanding of the motives for mass killings, this alleged behavior was seen as despicable and furthered the
process of “dehumanization of the victims,” a common precursor to
mass killings (p. 128).
The Atmosphere in Cedar City
In chapter 10 the scene shifts to Cedar City, the flower of the new
Iron Mission. By 1857, however, the quest for high-grade iron in Cedar
City had turned “to slag” (p. 129). In the 1850s, the main economic
pursuits in Utah were agriculture and livestock, and life was hard. In
Cedar City, however, it was doubly so. There didn’t seem to be enough
time or manpower to tend crops and cattle, mine iron ore and coal,
and make kilns, coke, and blast furnaces. Things might have been different had they experienced success. But instead they felt the acute
frustration of their repeated failure to produce commercial quality
iron. What resulted was a palpable sense of deprivation and poverty.
Thus the authors give credence to reports that the Cedar City settlers watched enviously as these well-provisioned and well-equipped
Arkansas companies passed by. But the spark that ignited the fatal
conflagration of events was the bitter clash that spontaneously arose
between the two sides. The difficulty in ascertaining the truth about
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this confrontation is compounded by the conflicting hearsay accounts.
Carefully sifting the sources, however, the authors give a credible
account of what unfolded. It was a cluster of irritants involving a dispute over trade, abusive language, fighting words, and resistance to
the authority of Cedar City’s marshal John Higbee.
In ordinary times the fracas would have quickly passed. In Cedar
City, however, many believed implicitly the rumors that U.S. troops
were poised to “invade” their isolated and exposed settlements. These
swirling rumors of imminent invasion, perhaps combined with some
emigrant’s passing threat, led some Cedar City settlers to conclude that
this emigrant train was in league with the hostile U.S. troops. Stake
president and militia major Isaac C. Haight played a leading role in what
ensued. So did Major John D. Lee in the nearby community of Fort
Harmony. Haight’s initial suggestion to Colonel Dame that militiamen
engage in a punitive action against the supposedly insolent emigrants
was rebuffed. Thereafter, Haight, Lee, and others concocted a plan to
use local Indians as surrogates to punish the emigrants. The “Cedar City
plan,” the authors conclude, began as a “harsh response to a minor conflict” but quickly began morphing “into a massacre of men, women, and
children” (p. 143). Citing the literature on mass killings, they explain:
“Perpetrators make many small and great decisions as they
progress along the continuum of destruction,” Ervin Staub
observed, and “extreme destructiveness . . . is usually the last
of many steps along [the] continuum.” According to Staub,
“There is usually a progression of actions. Earlier, less harmful acts cause changes in individual perpetrators, bystanders,
and the whole group that make more harmful acts possible.
The victims are further devalued. The self-concept of the perpetrators changes and allows them to inflict greater harm—
for ‘justifiable’ reasons. Ultimately, there is a commitment to
. . . mass killing.” (p. 143)
Later, writing about Haight and Lee, the authors conclude:
In retrospect their motives made little sense, but the continuum that leads to mass murder is not a rational process. Both
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men were being swept by “powerful forces” into “greater acts
of cruelty, violence, . . . [and] oppression.” Both Haight and Lee
were quick to make judgments and to execute on those decisions—hallmarks of extralegal justice and unchecked power.
(pp. 144–45)
Concurrent with these actions in southern Utah, Brigham Young
and Dimick Huntington were meeting with the chiefs and headmen of
the Utes, Pahvant Utes, and Southern Paiutes from central and southern Utah. In an attempt to cement an alliance with these Indian bands,
Huntington later recorded that he offered them “all the cattle that had
gone to Cal the southe rout” (p. 146). Among those present were the
Paiute headmen, Tutsegavits and Youngwuds. Tutsegavits’s bands gathered seeds and farmed along the lower Santa Clara River near Fort Clara,
while Youngwuds’s bands ranged the region around Fort Harmony.
Based upon Young and Huntington’s offer, the authors state,
[Historian Will] Bagley concluded that when Young “gave
the Paiute chiefs the emigrants’ cattle on the southern road
to California,” he “encouraged his Indian allies to attack the
Fancher party.” (p. 146)
But the authors convincingly show that Tutsegavits and Youngwuds
did not race their ponies back to southern Utah to lead their bands
in an attack on the emigrants. (Indeed, there is little evidence that
Southern Paiutes possessed horses until after the 1850s.) Rather, like
many American Indians before and since, they spent days touring and
exploring the marvels of the white man’s city. There is good contemporary evidence that Tutsegavits was in Great Salt Lake City until at
least 13 September, well after the 11 September massacre.3
3. Some members of Tutsegavits’s and Youngwuds’s Paiute bands did participate in the attacks on the emigrant train, but at the independent instigation of Isaac
Haight, John D. Lee, and others in southern Utah. There is also evidence that Kanosh
and the other Pahvant Ute chiefs and headmen left Salt Lake City ahead of the Paiutes,
Tutsegavits and Youngwuds, to return to their traditional summer lands in central Utah.
But there is no evidence that the Pahvant Utes participated in the attacks or the massacre
at Mountain Meadows. They were involved in the fracas with the Turner, Dukes, and
Collins companies near Beaver. These trains followed several days behind the Arkansas
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The Unfolding Plan to Use Paiute Indians as Surrogates
Meanwhile, in southern Utah, Isaac Haight was presenting his
and Lee’s plan to other church and community leaders. As chapter
11 explains, this occurred in Cedar City on Sunday, 6 September, at
the traditional council meeting held following church services. To
Haight’s surprise and consternation, not all of the community leaders were in accord, and blacksmith Laban Morrill, a flinty Vermont
native, pressed him to promise that he would not act until he had
consulted with President Young. Haight reluctantly agreed but then
delayed until the next day to send couriers. Monday afternoon he sent
an express to Pinto with a message (presumably intended for Lee) to
delay further action. At the same time Haight dispatched Englishman
James Haslam to Great Salt Lake City on an arduous 250-mile ride.
Throughout their ad hoc campaign, however, southern Utahns
were bedeviled by ham-fisted planning and poor communications.
The initial plan was to attack the emigrants after they had drifted farther south into Santa Clara Canyon. But for reasons known only to
John D. Lee, his Indian allies (probably assisted by some whites) made
the attack on Monday morning, 7 September, while the emigrants
were still encamped at the southern end of Mountain Meadows.
The Massacre
What follows in chapters 12 through 14 is the depressingly familiar story of how this ill-conceived and poorly executed punitive action
degenerated into mass slaughter. The narrative is full of new details,
many of them gleaned from new sources, thus giving a fresh view of
the sequence and motivation for key events. According to their interpretation of conflicting sources, it was late Monday when Mormon
scouts encountered two emigrant horsemen who were out retrieving stray cattle. The militiamen shot at both of them, killing one. But
the other—the “Dutchman”—evaded their bullets and raced back to
the wagon circle at the southern end of the Meadows. This incident
company. Ammon, the powerful Ute chief who had attended the powwow with Brigham
Young on 1 September, helped defuse that crisis (pp. 148, 162, 175–78, 265–70).
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would prove fateful. By late Thursday evening a leading faction of the
militiamen—probably including the senior Mormon leaders on-site,
John Higbee, John D. Lee, and Philip Klingensmith—had concluded
that the emigrants were fully aware that Mormons had “interposed”
and had either instigated or were actively assisting the Indians in
their attacks on the company. With the emigrants in front of them
and fearing that the invading U.S. Army was at their rear, the militiamen felt an enormous pressure to silence all witnesses. Otherwise the
California-bound emigrants could raise a militia there and the isolated
southern Utah settlers would face a two-front conflict. In the end, in
their warped and distorted impression of reality, they concluded that
it was imperative to silence all credible witnesses. To save their own
skins, they hatched a deceptive ruse to lure the emigrants from their
defensive wagon circle. Then at the agreed signal, the militiamen and
Indians fell upon the unarmed emigrants. Within minutes they had
killed all the emigrants except seventeen of the very youngest, who
militia leaders supposed would have few credible memories of what
they had witnessed. Several escaping emigrants were also hunted
down and killed on the Nevada desert.
The authors conclude:
The tragedy at Mountain Meadows played out on several levels. The murdered emigrants lost their hopes, their dreams,
their property, and their lives. Some lost their very identity,
their names forever effaced from human memory. The surviving children were robbed of the warmth and support of
parents, brothers, and sisters. Their first sobbing night at
Hamblin’s was just the start of their ordeal. The Paiute participants would bear the brunt of the blame for the massacre, shamelessly used by the white men who lured them to the
Meadows. For the militiamen who carried out the crime—as
well as their families, descendants, and fellow church members—there was another kind of tragedy. It was the gnawing,
long anguish that flows from betrayed ideals. The burdens of
the massacre would linger far beyond what anyone imagined
on the night of September 11, 1857. (p. 209)
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The next morning Colonel Dame and Major Haight, accompanied
by staff members, arrived at the death scene. Dame was aghast at the
number of victims and was heard to exclaim, “I did not think that there
were so many women and children.” Then he and Major Haight fell to
quarreling about how it should be reported. Dame protested that he had
not been informed of the true situation. At one point Haight responded
savagely, “It is too late in the day for you to back water. You know you
ordered it . . . and now you want to back out” (p. 213).
But Haight was to receive his own surprise the following day
when James Haslam returned, exhausted, from his journey to Great
Salt Lake City. Haslam arrived in the wee hours of Sunday morning,
13 September, having made his 500-mile round-trip ride in less than
six days. After grabbing some sleep, he met with Haight. “Haslam
handed Haight the unsealed letter from Young directing him to let
the emigrants ‘go in peace.’ Haight took the letter, read through it,
and broke down. For half an hour, he sobbed ‘like a child’ and could
manage only the words, ‘Too late, too late’” (p. 226).
Evaluation
How well have the authors achieved their stated purposes? What
are the strengths and weaknesses of Massacre at Mountain Meadows?
Walker, Turley, and Leonard’s book is well conceived and well
executed. Its single greatest contribution is its skillful use of the salient
material from more than four decades of study of American violence.
Since the 1960s there has been a flood of scholarship on past and contemporary American violence. Massacre at Mountain Meadows is the
first monograph to incorporate that scholarship into a framework for
viewing the massacre.
Until now many have found the massacre nearly incomprehensible. Yet the studies on violence argue that there is a pattern to many
mass killings. Accumulating detail upon detail, the authors skillfully
show how the evidence fits this pattern. An indicator of their success
is that the farther the 1857 Iron County militia went down the path
of violence, the more likely became the ensuing massacre. From the
standpoint of American historians, Massacre at Mountain Meadows’
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theoretical framework drawn from the findings of violence studies is
its most important contribution.
In the century and a half since the disaster at Mountain Meadows,
many have essentially argued an exceptionalist position with regard
to the massacre. They view the massacre as being in a class of its own.
It is, they claim, so thoroughly unique as to defy meaningful comparison with other mass killings. For them it is sui generis. But the
authors of Massacre at Mountain Meadows, in grounding their study
in the literature on the causes and conditions of American violence,
have implicitly issued a challenge to the exceptionalist position. They
have presented the patterns of mass killings and shown the similarities that Mountain Meadows has with other massacres. Henceforth, it
will not be acceptable for historians to treat the massacre while being
wholly ignorant of the broader literature on mass killings, massacres,
and genocides. In particular, advocates of the exceptionalist position
ignore this scholarly literature at their peril. It also bears mentioning
that given the current philosophy and practice of history, most professional historians view exceptionalist claims with great skepticism.4
Therefore, those claiming that the massacre was sui generis will have
a heavy burden of proof.
Within the Mormon community this book marks a sea change in
attitudes toward the massacre. For Mormons and Mormon watchers,
it is significant that this is a semiofficial acknowledgment of the massacre and a repudiation of the mood, means, and methods that brought
4. Exceptionalism claims that a past event is transcendently good (e.g., Progress, the
rise of the American nation) or evil (e.g., Hitler, Nazism, the Holocaust). For extended
discussions of the challenges to historical objectivity and “metanarratives,” including
American exceptionalism, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question”
and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988);
Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New
York: Norton, 1994); Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From
Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press,
1997); Norman J. Wilson, History in Crisis? Recent Directions in Historiography (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999); and Alun Munslow, The Routledge Companion
to Historical Studies (London: Routledge, 2000). For rebuttals to these challenges, see
Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are
Murdering Our Past (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 1996); and Richard J. Evans, In
Defense of History (New York: Norton, 1999).
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it about. That this viewpoint has been published in the church’s flagship magazine, the Ensign (that is, in Richard Turley’s article on the
massacre in September 2007), indicates that the church hierarchy has
formally acknowledged the role of Mormons in the massacre. Another
indication is the public apology issued by the First Presidency on
11 September 2007, at the sesquicentennial memorial service. In public addresses since then, Turley has argued against employing the old
discourse of denying, defending, distorting, minimizing, rationalizing, excusing, or “passing the buck” about the massacre. Instead he
has argued that Latter-day Saints should forthrightly acknowledge the
massacre and honor its victims. Coming from the Assistant Church
Historian of the church, that reflects a significant change. There will
undoubtedly be individual Mormons who will continue in defending, excusing, or justifying the massacre. But with this semiofficial
acknowledgment, the church leadership and most of the membership
will begin abandoning the old viewpoint, if they haven’t already.
What are the book’s weaknesses and limitations? I have already
raised the issue of polygamy and whether it is given adequate stress.
Similarly, have the authors sufficiently considered and explained some
of the other unique features of frontier Mormon culture? Juanita Brooks
and others have cited several features of frontier Mormonism as contributory to the massacre. These include the alleged excesses of the
Mormon Reformation of 1856–57, the doctrine of blood atonement,
the so-called oath of vengeance, and sanguinary patriarchal blessings.
More recently, others have charged Brigham Young with “giving” the
livestock of travelers on the overland trail to the Indians and tolerating a climate conducive to extralegal violence. While the authors do
not discuss allegedly sanguinary patriarchal blessings, emphasis on the
importance of this as a contributing factor seems to have waned. As for
the other charges, the authors discuss the Reformation, blood atonement, an alleged oath of vengeance (albeit in a footnote), Young’s Indian
policy of offering Indians cattle on the overland trail, and the occasional
resort to extralegal violence. In a complex event with many contributing
causes, the relative importance of individual causes is controversial, and
judgments about the adequacy of the authors’ responses will vary.
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One area that will require further investigation is extralegal violence. Extralegal violence in territorial Utah is a difficult and controversial topic. Some have exaggerated the scope of the problem with
sweeping claims about widespread “frontier justice” in Utah during
the entire latter half of the nineteenth century. Conversely, many
Mormons reject these charges out of hand. Both positions are wrong.
There was one notably problematic period, and it corresponds to the
time of the Mountain Meadows Massacre during the difficult years
of 1857–58. Early in 1857, the party of John Tobin was attacked in
southern Utah. In March, the Parrish-Potters murders occurred in
Springville. In September, at the outset of the Utah War, the Mountain
Meadows Massacre occurred. The following month, Richard Yates, a
suspected spy, was executed without due process of law, and at end of
the year the Aiken party, also suspected of spying, was killed.5
There were other violent episodes in the 1850s. From our twentyfirst-century perspective, criminal penalties were applied inconsistently during the early frontier period. In a few cases, harsh punishments were applied extralegally. In others, the punishments meted out
seem unusually light. In still others, Mormon leaders failed to punish
their vengeful followers at all, creating the impression that these followers could act with impunity. Such incidents created an impression
of lawlessness that was to dog the Mormons into the twentieth century.
The answer to this broader question is beyond the scope of Massacre
at Mountain Meadows but will require continuing research. The analytical framework used by the authors to understand the Mountain
Meadows Massacre will be useful in understanding the other episodes
in 1857–58. Moreover, I suspect that a comparative approach applied
to Mormons and other Westerners in frontier settings will show many
similarities as well as differences.
A perennial issue in historical writing is the reliability of sources
and their interpretation. Here we should state plainly that the Mountain
Meadows Massacre is one of the most challenging historiographical
5. See generally William P. MacKinnon, ed., At Sword’s Point, Part I: A Documentary
History of the Utah War to 1858 (Norman, OK: Clark, 2008), 77–80 (Tobin), 317–18
(Parrish-Potter), 297–302 (Yates), and 316–19 (Aiken).
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problems in the American West. The technical challenges are daunting, exacerbated by missing documents, hearsay accounts, and false
accounts. Moreover, in some cases perpetrators or their family or
friends were guilty of denying, distorting, or excusing the massacre. In
other cases, perpetrators eventually spoke candidly about their roles,
but their statements were made decades after the massacre. Thus even
when they spoke on topics about which they had no reason to lie, they
frequently contradict one another on simple matters of chronology.
All these issues will have to be addressed with the “new” Andrew
Jenson sources from the 1890s. But the new material contains much
valuable information. Indian interpreters and militiamen Nephi
Johnson and Samuel Knight both made statements included in the
Jenson materials. But they also made various other well-known statements. A comparison of elements from each source will determine
consistent as well as inconsistent elements.
The case of militiaman Ellott Willden presents a different situation. Willden’s only extant written statements are found in the Jenson
material. Made some thirty-five years after the massacre, how reliable are they? A basic rule of interpretation is that statements made
“against interest” are usually reliable, or as historian Louis Gottschalk
said, “when a statement is prejudicial to a witness, his dear ones, or
his causes, it is likely to be truthful.”6 Many of Willden’s statements
are confessions of his significant involvement in the massacre, and
these statements bear these indicia of reliability. For instance, Willden
admits that he and his companions were among the first militiamen
sent to the Meadows and that they were ordered “to find . . . something that would justify the Indians being let loose upon the emigrants” (p. 140). Willden informs us that the initial plan was to attack
the emigrants farther south, and he admits that he and his companions were at Mountain Meadows to get the emigrants to “move on” so
that they might more quickly fall into the trap laid for them (p. 140).
Moreover, while many militia accounts emphasize the misbehavior of
the Arkansas emigrants, Willden concedes that the emigrants “acted
6. Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method (New
York: Knopf, 1950, rev. 1969), 161.

Walker, Turley, Leonard, Mountain Meadows (Briggs) • 233

civil” when he visited their camp (p. 152). He also admits that he
and his companions were at the Meadows when they heard the initial attack (p. 159). Finally, Willden informs us that the Lee-inspired
attack at Mountain Meadows was “not part of the plan,” an incidental
detail about which he had no reason to lie and which is also corroborated by other witnesses (p. 159).
This does not mean that all the details are accurate. For example, the sources are inconsistent about the fateful encounter between
Mormon scouts and the emigrant riders who had backtracked toward
Cedar City in search of stray livestock—the encounter in which one or
more was killed but at least one successfully retreated to the safety of
the emigrant wagon circle. When did it occur? Relying on Willden’s
account, the authors place the event on Monday, 7 September, the evening of the first attack. Yet John D. Lee placed the event on Tuesday or
Wednesday evening.7 The authors have accepted Willden’s chronology while I, not having access to the Willden source, had provisionally
accepted Lee’s dating.8 Reviewing the new source material and comparing it with the existing sources will allow historians to continue
the process of evaluating this difficult material.
But differences of opinion are to be expected in interpreting difficult source material. With an evidentiary record as challenging as this
one, we may expect such controversies to endure as long as people have
an interest in the massacre. There are dozens and perhaps hundreds of
examples in which the sources are in conflict over basic chronology or
other details.9 But this problem should not be overemphasized. While
7. Statement of John D. Lee to S. Howard, Salt Lake Daily Tribune, 28 March 1877,
in Robert Kent and Dorothy S. Fielding, The Tribune Reports of the Trials of John D. Lee
(Higganum, CT: Kent’s Books, 2000), 282; John D. Lee, Mormonism Unveiled; or The Life
and Confessions of John D. Lee (St. Louis: Bryan, Brand & Co., 1877), 235; Statement of
John M. Higbee, February 1894, in Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950, rev. 1962, 1970), 229–30.
8. Robert H. Briggs, “The Mountain Meadows Massacre: An Analytical Narrative
Based on Participant Confessions,” Utah Historical Quarterly 74/4 (2006): 327–28.
9. In the example I cited of the fateful episode in which one of the emigrant outriders escaped Mormon scouts and returned to the safety of the wagon circle, Ellott Willden
placed the event on the evening of Monday, 7 September. In John D. Lee’s 1877 statement
delivered to federal prosecutor Sumner Howard, Lee said that the incident occurred on
Tuesday evening, 8 September. In Mormonism Unveiled, Lee’s posthumously published
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some of us may quibble about particular details, I believe that the
broad picture the authors have derived from the sources is essentially
correct. The date on which the encounter occurred as described by
Willden, Lee, and others is of minor importance. What is important is
that Mormon sentries attacked a small party of emigrant riders, killing one or more. One escaped and returned to the emigrant camp to
spread the word that the Mormons had “interposed.” This was a fateful event that inexorably led the militiamen, under the delusion that
they were being invaded by the U.S. Army, to conclude that silencing
the party was their only viable option. While the exact chronology
of the event may have been muddled, the significance of it became
crystal clear at the Thursday evening militia council. According to Lee
and others, the discussion in the militia council of the emigrants’ supposed awareness of Mormon involvement played a pivotal role in the
horrible decision to silence them.
This is hands down the most exhaustively researched history of
the massacre since it occurred. Is Massacre at Mountain Meadows an
instant classic? Yes, in the sense that it will be required reading for
every present and future student of the massacre. But is it a classic
in the sense that it has put to rest the controversies concerning the
massacre for the current generation of scholars? No. The massacre’s
hold on the public imagination is great. Like Custer’s Last Stand, it
has entered the historiographical pantheon of the American West.
Many see it as a powerful case study of how religious excess can go
terribly awry. For these it has become a potent mythic symbol of religious fanaticism. Others are both attracted and repelled by its ghastly
violence. Many will be drawn by the challenges of this iconic event to
add their own interpretations.
Thus this is not the final word on the massacre, nor will it silence
debate about many of its details. But in bringing the conclusions of
violence studies to bear on the massacre, Walker, Turley, and Leonard
autobiography, Lee maintained that it occurred on Wednesday evening, 9 September.
Thus, the event happened on Monday evening, Tuesday evening, or Wednesday evening,
depending on which of the sources one chooses to accept. The sources are rife with similar chronological issues.
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have opened a new chapter in the study of Mountain Meadows.
Furthermore, faced with a historical record laced with maddening
contradictions and challenges, the authors of Massacre at Mountain
Meadows have succeeded in interpreting the essentials of the massacre correctly. This may seem like damning with faint praise. But given
the enormous difficulties that historians of the massacre face, the fact
that Walker, Turley, and Leonard got the essential details of the picture right while placing them in such a new and illuminating frame is
high praise indeed.

